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Günther, Michael; Hellmann, Tim: Local and Global Pollution and International Environmental Agreements in a Network Approach. In: . Jg.545. 2015, S. 40 ff.
Inhalt
Introduction
Background and Literature Review
A Pollution Game of Local and Global Spillovers
Model Setup
The Free-Rider Problem in the Single Stage Game
Stable IEAs in Infinitely Repeated Games
The Infinitely Repeated Game
Weakly Renegotiation-Proof Coalitions
WRP Conditions for Special Spillover Structures
Comparative Statics
The effect of the spillover structure
Additional punishers
The Stability of a Global IEA
Social Benefits and Costs
Social Benefits
Social Costs of Punishment
Extensions
Other Punishment Strategies
Stronger Punishment
Longer Punishment
Directed Networks
Formation of an IEA
Conclusion
Appendices
Proofs
References