Li, Yuanyuan: Information and discrimination: foundations and applications to credit and labor markets. 2016
Inhalt
- Contents
- 1 General Introduction
- 1.1 Imperfect Information and Information criteria
- 1.2 Information imperfection on the credit market and credit crisis
- 1.3 Imperfections of labor market and discrimination
- 1.4 Outline of the thesis
- 2 Informativeness and the dispersion of posterior distributions
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Informativeness and dispersive orders
- 2.2.1 Information systems
- 2.2.2 The preference over different signals
- 2.2.3 Blackwell's informativeness
- 2.2.4 Orders of dispersion
- 2.3 Relationship between informativeness and supermodular precision
- 2.4 Other information criteria and the dispersion of posteriors
- 2.5 Conclusion
- 2.A Proofs of propositions
- 3 Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 The model
- 3.3 Market equilibrium
- 3.3.1 Definition
- 3.3.2 Characterization
- 3.3.3 Characterization with respect to the safe interest factor R0
- 3.4 Credit supply and market transparency
- 3.5 Macroeconomic dynamics
- 3.6 Conclusion
- 3.A More propositions on multiple equilibria
- 3.B Proofs of propositions.
- 4 Holdup and hiring discrimination with search friction
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 The model without discrimination
- 4.2.1 Strategies, matching probabilities and payoff functions
- 4.2.2 Decentralized market equilibrium without discrimination
- 4.2.3 Constrained efficient allocations
- 4.3 The model with hiring discrimination
- 4.3.1 The case of strong discrimination: x=1
- 4.3.2 Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
- 4.3.3 Analysis under our context
- 4.4 Discussion
- 4.4.1 Comparision with wage bargaining
- 4.4.2 Free entry
- 4.4.3 Heterogeneity in skill investment cost.
- 4.5 Conclusion
- 4.A Derivation of matching probabilities.
- 4.B Sketch of the proofs of the results in LMD (2005)
- 4.C Proofs of propositions
- 5 General Conclusion
- References
- Résumé (Summary in French)