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Eryzhenskiy, Ilya: Household Credit: Regulation, Constraints and Macroeconomic Implications. 2022
Inhalt
Introduction (en français)
Introduction (in English)
Intergenerational Redistribution with Endogenous Constraints to Private Debt
Introduction
Related literature
Model
Equilibrium
Equilibrium with full commitment
Equilibrium with limited commitment
Equilibrium autarky
Decentralization with transfers and government debt
Optimal allocations
Decentralization with full commitment
Decentralization with limited commitment
Decentralization with limited commitment: an example
Decentralization and autarky
Comparison to simple borrowing constraints
Conclusion
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof of Proposition 10
Endogenous Debt Constraints and Rational Bubbles in an OLG Growth Model (with Bertrand Wigniolle)
Introduction
Endogenous constraint and global dynamics
The model
The equilibrium dynamics
Bubbles and equilibrium default
The model with bubbles and default
Equilibrium dynamics in the case Lg
The case Lg
Conclusion
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof of Proposition 18
Proof of Proposition 19
Interest Rate Restriction Results in Shorter Housing Loans: Evidence from France
Introduction
Institutional framework
Housing credit market in France
Interest rate restriction
Data
Stylized facts
Hypotheses
Empirical strategy
Differences in term and in time
Difference in term and ceilings
Discussion
Results
Difference in terms and in time
Difference in terms and in ceilings
Magnitude of the reform effects
Robustness and additional results
Placebo: loans unaffected by reform
Influence of loan refinancing
Banks vs. specialized institutions
Large bank sub-sample
Quarterly differences in term and in time
Conclusion
Appendix for Chapter 3
Dataset description
Tables
Institutional framework
Descriptive statistics
Difference in terms and time estimates
Difference in term and ceilings estimates
Additional results, robustness
Graphs
Descriptive graphs
Difference-in-difference estimates
Additional results, robustness
Conclusion