TY  - GEN
AB  - We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.
DA  - 2004
KW  - Perles-Maschler solution
KW  - Object division
KW  - Market procedure
LA  - eng
PY  - 2004
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-6050
Y2  - 2024-11-22T10:54:14
ER  -