TY  - CHAP
AB  - With the advent of communicating machines in the form of embodied agents the question gets ever more interesting under which circumstances such systems could be attributed some sort of consciousness and self-identity. We are likely to ascribe to an agent with human appearance and conducting reasonable natural language dialog that it has desires, goals, and intentions. Taking the example of ’Max’, a humanoid agent embodied in virtual reality, this contribution examines under which circumstances an artificial agent could be said to have intentional states and perceive others as intentional agents. We will link our examination to the question of how such a system could have selfawareness and how this is grounded in its (virtual) physis and its social context. We shall discuss how Max could be equipped with the capacity to differentiate between his own and a partner’s mental states and under which conditions Max could reasonably speak of himself as ’I’.
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-540-79037-2_15
LA  - eng
PY  - 2008
SN  - 978-3-540-79036-5
TI  - 'I, Max' - Communicating with an artificial agent
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-19988418
Y2  - 2024-11-21T18:07:29
ER  -