TY  - GEN
AB  - Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies.
The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively.
DA  - 2003
KW  - Nash solution
KW  - Core equivalence
KW  - Core convergence
LA  - eng
PY  - 2003
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-4361
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:33:48
ER  -