TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper we study competitve outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced. The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core. Second, it is shown that the full core of a completion-balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy. As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.
DA  - 2004
KW  - Endogenous coalition formation
KW  - Cooperative games
KW  - Full core
KW  - Core
KW  - Equilibrium
LA  - eng
PY  - 2004
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-6040
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:49:40
ER  -