TY  - GEN
AB  - We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.
DA  - 2005
KW  - Object division market
KW  - Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
KW  - Support result
LA  - eng
PY  - 2005
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012
Y2  - 2024-11-22T10:28:35
ER  -