TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
DA  - 2005
KW  - Stability
KW  - Nash implementation
KW  - Matching with contracts
KW  - (Maskin) monotonicity
LA  - eng
PY  - 2005
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7662
Y2  - 2024-11-22T11:59:49
ER  -