TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
DA  - 2006
DO  - 10.2139/ssrn.948414
KW  - Strict core
KW  - Semi-value
KW  - Shapley value
KW  - Banzhaf value
KW  - Simple game
KW  - Hedonic game
LA  - eng
PY  - 2006
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9969
Y2  - 2024-11-22T09:12:47
ER  -