TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.
DA  - 2006
KW  - Paradox of smaller coalitions
KW  - Coalition formation
KW  - Winning coalitions
KW  - Semistrict core
KW  - Simple games
LA  - eng
PY  - 2006
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13577
Y2  - 2024-11-22T09:18:18
ER  -