TY  - GEN
AB  - Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.
DA  - 2007
KW  - Bargaining games
KW  - Implementation
KW  - Mechanism
KW  - Maskin monotonicity
KW  - Nash program
KW  - Social choice rule
LA  - eng
PY  - 2007
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-11274
Y2  - 2024-11-22T10:29:16
ER  -