TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
DA  - 2008
KW  - Stability
KW  - Nash implementation
KW  - Matching with couples
KW  - (Maskin) monotonicity
KW  - Weakly responsive preferences
LA  - eng
PY  - 2008
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
Y2  - 2024-11-22T11:07:05
ER  -