TY  - GEN
AB  - We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.
DA  - 2008
KW  - Communication game
KW  - Dynamic stability
KW  - Cheap talk
KW  - Voronoi tesselation
KW  - Signaling game
LA  - eng
PY  - 2008
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15602
Y2  - 2024-11-22T08:48:55
ER  -