TY  - GEN
AB  - We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.
DA  - 2009
KW  - Coalition formation
KW  - Cooperative games
KW  - Stable coalition
KW  - Shapley value
KW  - Airport Problem
LA  - eng
PY  - 2009
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Coalition formation in the Airport Problem
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-bipr-47765
Y2  - 2024-11-22T05:21:10
ER  -