TY  - GEN
AB  - This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best reply correspondence introduced by Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2012). An example demonstrates that this correspondence can be very different from the standard best reply correspondence. In two-player games, however, the refined best reply correspondence of a given game is the same as the best reply correspondence of a slightly modified game. The 
modified game is derived from the original game by reducing the payoff by a small amount for all pure strategies that are weakly inferior. Weakly inferior strategies, for two-player games, are pure strategies that are either weakly dominated or are equivalent to a proper mixture of other pure strategies. Fixed points of the 
refined best reply correspondence are not equivalent to any known Nash equilibrium refinement. A class of simple communication games demonstrates the usefulness and intuitive appeal of the refined best reply correspondence.
DA  - 2012
KW  - strict and weak dominance
KW  - strategic stability
KW  - Nash equilibrium refinements
KW  - best-response correspondence
KW  - persistent equilibria
LA  - eng
PY  - 2012
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 21-
TI  - The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26717370
Y2  - 2024-11-22T08:18:29
ER  -