TY  - GEN
AB  - We analyze indirect evolutionary two-player games to identify the dynamic emergence
of (strong) reciprocity in a large number of economic settings. The underlying evolutionary
environment allows for an arbitrary initial population state provided that
every degree of the compact space of reciprocity is adherent to at least one individual
of the corresponding continuum population. The basic results, which essentially
maintain the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, are, in several directions, context
dependent, and minimum valid for the wide class of evolutionary dynamics which
hold for regularity and payoff-monotonicity. The evolutionary solution concept which
is applied to elevate the explanatory power of emerging Nash equilibria is dominance
solvability, in this case, for continuous strategy spaces. An asymmetric aspect comes
into play since the actions of the evolutionary players are not only determined by the
current state of reciprocity but also by their inherent, context-free preferences towards
others which differ among one another devoid of being endogenized in the time span
of the dynamic process at hand.
DA  - 2011
KW  - Reciprocity
KW  - Evolutionary Game Theory
KW  - Dominance Solvability
KW  - Asymmetric Game Setting
KW  - Payoff-monotonic Dynamics
LA  - eng
PY  - 2011
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 31-
TI  - A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26717616
Y2  - 2024-11-22T05:32:16
ER  -