TY  - GEN
AB  - We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible
and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.
DA  - 2012
KW  - repeated games
KW  - symmetry
KW  - experiments
KW  - focal points
LA  - eng
PY  - 2012
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 43-
TI  - Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26724939
Y2  - 2024-11-22T12:49:03
ER  -