TY  - GEN
AB  - Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where
players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of
objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity
of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953):
rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies.
We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such
extensive form Ellsberg games.
DA  - 2013
KW  - Rectangularity
KW  - Kuhn's Theorem
KW  - Strategic Ambiguity
KW  - Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
KW  - Knightian Uncertainty in Games
KW  - Objective Ambiguity
LA  - eng
PY  - 2013
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 22-
TI  - Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26740884
Y2  - 2024-11-22T05:25:50
ER  -