TY  - GEN
AB  - Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy)equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game.
DA  - 2014
KW  - evolutionary stability
KW  - best-response dynamics
KW  - CSS
KW  - incomplete information
KW  - continuously stable strategy
LA  - eng
PY  - 2014
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 17-
TI  - Coordination with independent private values: why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26753365
Y2  - 2024-11-22T04:31:45
ER  -