TY  - CHAP
AB  - In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states,
such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind
this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent
properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon
under examination. Using a neural architecture that shows the abilities of
autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning
cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the
underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested
in a robot-control system.
We do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious
in the first place. On the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control
behavior. Only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent descriptions
of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be
applied to such an artificial system. Originally these phenomena are necessarily
defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. A
functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it
can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested,
for example, in a quantitative simulation. It is important to note that we are not
concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of
mental phenomena. This approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we
assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information concerning
the possible function of these phenomena. In other words, we assume that
phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacognition
(or reflexive consciousness). Following these arguments, we claim that our
network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it also
shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness
can be observed, too. Concerning consciousness, we argue that properties
assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our network,
including the property of global availability, which means that elements of
the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current
context. Further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of
properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness.
DO  - 10.15502/9783958570436
LA  - eng
PY  - 2015
TI  - Mental states as emergent properties. From walking to consciousness
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27131108
Y2  - 2024-11-22T01:23:44
ER  -