TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each player is only able to observe their own effort, not the effort of others.
I characterize the optimal effort path for general distributions of breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination is not a result of irrational behavior and is even present in the welfare-maximizing solution.
DA  - 2015
KW  - Moral hazard in teams
KW  - Public good provision
KW  - Procrastination
LA  - eng
PY  - 2015
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 31-
TI  - Procrastination and projects
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27647303
Y2  - 2024-11-22T04:21:04
ER  -