TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper, the search model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms are uncertain about the job seekers' number of friends, who can help them in the job search (social capital). All workers have the same productivity and differ only in the social capital. A firm offers a take-it-or-leave-it wage contract to a worker after checking the worker's profile and her public number of non-fictitious social contracts in the Social Network System in the Internet. This number serves as a noisy signal of the social capital for firms and cannot be influenced by the worker only for signalling purpose. The model generates a positive relationship between the number of contacts in the Social Network System and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. In addition, the presence of firm's uncertainty with respect to workers' possibilities to find jobs through social contacts increases overall social welfare.
DA  - 2015
KW  - asymmetric information
KW  - social capital
KW  - uncertainty
KW  - Social Network System
KW  - Facebook
KW  - Linkedin
KW  - wage contract
KW  - social welfare
KW  - wage dispersion
LA  - eng
PY  - 2015
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 32-
TI  - Asymmetric information in a search model with social contacts
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27856526
Y2  - 2024-11-22T05:04:09
ER  -