TY  - GEN
AB  - This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for a
strategic timing problem, where two firms have the (real) option to invest irreversibly
in some market. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The
analysis of the problem emphasizes its dynamic nature and exploits only its economic
structure. In particular, the determination of equilibria with preemption is reduced to
solving a single class of constrained stopping problems. The general results are applied to
typical state-space models from the literature, to point out common deficits in equilibrium
arguments and to suggest alternative equilibria that are Pareto improvements.
DA  - 2015
KW  - optimal stopping.
KW  - equilibrium
KW  - Preemption
KW  - irreversible investment
KW  - real options
LA  - eng
PY  - 2015
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 37-
TI  - Preemptive Investment under Uncertainty
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27859710
Y2  - 2024-11-22T13:31:32
ER  -