TY  - GEN
AB  - We demonstrate that in simple 2 x 2 games (cumulative) prospect theory
preferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players with
prospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. This
holds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of mixed
strategies. We also show that in a typical game with infinitely many strategies,
the “war of attrition”, probability weighting is evolutionarily stable.
Finally, we generalize to other notions of stability. Our results may help to
explain why probability weighting is generally observed in humans, although
it is not optimal in usual decision problems.
DA  - 2009
KW  - prospect theory
KW  - existence of Nash equilibria
KW  - evolutionary stability
LA  - eng
PY  - 2009
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 22-
TI  - Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27883871
Y2  - 2024-11-22T05:40:32
ER  -