TY  - GEN
AB  - This paper studies collective decision making with regard to convex
risk measures: It addresses the question whether there exist nondictatorial
aggregation functions of convex risk measures satisfying
Arrow-type rationality axioms (weak universality, systematicity, Pareto
principle). Herein, convex risk measures are identified with variational
preferences on account of the Maccheroni-Marinacci-Rustichini (2006)
axiomatisation of variational preference relations and the Föllmer-
Schied (2002, 2004) representation theorem for concave monetary utility
functionals.
We prove a variational analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem
for finite electorates. For infinite electorates, the possibility of rational
aggregation depends on a uniform continuity condition for the variational
preference profiles; we prove variational analogues of both Campbell's
impossibility theorem and Fishburn's possibility theorem. The proof
methodology is based on a model-theoretic approach to aggregation theory
inspired by Lauwers-Van Liedekerke (1995).
An appendix applies the Dietrich-List (2010) analysis of majority
voting to the problem of variational preference aggregation.
DA  - 2010
KW  - convex risk measure
KW  - multiple priorspreferences
KW  - variational preferences
KW  - abstract aggregation theory
KW  - judgment aggregation
KW  - Arrow-type preference aggregation
KW  - model theory
KW  - first-order predicate logic
KW  - ultraproduct
KW  - ultrafilter
LA  - eng
PY  - 2010
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 22-
TI  - Social choice of convex risk measures through Arrovian aggregation of variational preferences
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27883912
Y2  - 2024-11-22T04:57:07
ER  -