TY  - GEN
AB  - Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own
preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their
opponent’s preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive
costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of
getting informed about the opponent’s preferences is bounded away
from zero and one.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Incomplete Information
KW  - Information Acquisition
KW  - Theory of Mind
KW  - Conflict
KW  - Imperfect Empathy
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 42-
TI  - Cognitive empathy in conflict situations
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29003860
Y2  - 2024-11-22T01:10:55
ER  -