TY  - GEN
AB  - Ambiguity can be used as a strategic device in some situations. To
demonstrate this, we propose and study a framework for normal form
games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In
such Ellsberg games, players may use Ellsberg urns in addition to
the standard objective mixed strategies. We assume that players are
ambiguity-averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler. While classical Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the new game, there arise
new Ellsberg equilibria that can be quite different from Nash equilibria. A negotiation game with three players illustrates this finding.
Another class of examples shows the use of ambiguity in mediation.
We also highlight some conceptually interesting properties of Ellsberg
equilibria in two person games with conflicting interests.
DA  - 2011
LA  - eng
PY  - 2011
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 21-
TI  - The strategic use of ambiguity
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29009545
Y2  - 2024-11-22T17:15:43
ER  -