TY  - GEN
AB  - We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We
show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly
positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying
bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining
game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for
every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there
exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique
competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996, 2005) with
the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation for every
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative
foundations of cooperative games.
DA  - 2011
KW  - Inner Core
KW  - Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
KW  - Competitive Payoffs
KW  - Market Games
LA  - eng
PY  - 2011
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 28-
TI  - Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29009569
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:14:13
ER  -