TY  - GEN
AB  - In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication
games of common interest when signals are simple and
types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called
Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set
and Bayesian estimators on the side of receivers. In this note, we introduce
conflicts of interest in the same setting. We characterize strict
Nash equilibria as distorted Voronoi languages that use all messages.
For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist. If the
bias is sufficiently small, however, these equilibria do exist. This establishes
the robustness of the results in Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel
(2011) to biased interests. We finally give examples of strict Nash
equilibria, one of them using simulations to illustrate an equilibrium
with many messages and non-uniformly distributed types.
DA  - 2011
KW  - Cheap Talk
KW  - Signaling Game
KW  - Communication Game
KW  - Voronoi tesselation
KW  - Conflict of Interest
LA  - eng
PY  - 2011
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 15-
TI  - Distorted Voronoi languages
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29009823
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:41:08
ER  -