TY  - GEN
AB  - Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post
budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the
utility from participating in the mechanism to the lowest types is zero for all agents.
Such a mechanism must be of a threshold form, in which there is a fixed threshold for
each agent such that the public good is not provided if there is an agent with a value
below her threshold and is provided if all agents’ values exceed their respective threshold.
There are mechanism that are DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB that are not of the threshold
form. Mechanisms that maximize welfare subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB must again
have the threshold form. Finally, mechanisms that are DSIC, EPIR, EPBB and that
furthermore satisfy the condition that there is at least one type profile in which all agents
can block the provision of the public good, also must be of the threshold form. As we
allow individuals’ values for the public good to be negative and positive, our results cover
examples including bilateral trade, bilateral wage negotiations, a seller selling to a group
of individuals (who then have joint ownership rights), and rezoning the use of land.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Public good provision
KW  - asymmetric information
KW  - dominant strategy
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 21-
TI  - On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29012679
Y2  - 2024-11-22T12:00:10
ER  -