TY  - GEN
AB  - Riedel and Sass (2013) study complete information normal form
games in which ambiguity averse players use ambiguous randomization strategies, in addition to pure and mixed strategies. The solution concept they propose, the Ellsberg equilibrium, is a coarsening of the
classical Nash equilibrium. We provide a foundation of the new equilibrium concept in the spirit of Harsanyi. We prove an extension of the Purification Theorem for 2x2 normal form games. Our result implies that any Ellsberg equilibrium of such game is the limit case of a mixed strategy equilibrium in a disturbed version of the game for
which payoffs are ambiguously disturbed.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Knightian uncertainty
KW  - Ellsberg games
KW  - Ambiguity aversion
KW  - Purification
KW  - Disambiguation
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 43-
TI  - Disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria in 2x2 normal form games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29013618
Y2  - 2024-11-22T07:02:30
ER  -