TY  - GEN
AB  - Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural
desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain,
respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights — which can
be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List
(2008) have generalised this result to the setting of binary judgement
aggregation. This paper proves that the liberal paradox holds even in
the framework of probabilistic opinion pooling and discusses options to
circumvent this impossibility result: restricting the aggregator domain
to profiles with no potential for conflicting rights, or considering agendas
whose issues are not all mutually interdependent.
DA  - 2014
KW  - probabilistic opinion pooling
KW  - Sen’s liberal paradox
KW  - expert rights
KW  - liberal rights
KW  - unanimity
KW  - general aggregation theory
LA  - eng
PY  - 2014
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 6-
TI  - Respect for experts or respect for unanimity? The liberal paradox in probabilistic opinion pooling
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29015994
Y2  - 2024-11-22T07:56:15
ER  -