TY  - GEN
AB  - We study investments in R&D and the formation of R&D clusters of firms
which are competitors in the market. In a three stage game, firms first decide on
long-term R&D investment, then form research clusters according to the unanim-
ity game introduced in Bloch(1995), and finally compete in quantities. For some
range of investment costs, equilibria with no-investment co-exist with equilibria
where a large fraction of firms invest in R&D. Because of the effects of R&D
investment on cluster membership, firms tend to over-invest compared to a sce-
nario where research clusters are ex-ante fixed and also compared to the welfare
optimum.
DA  - 2016
KW  - R&D
KW  - cluster formation
KW  - oligopoly
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 50-
TI  - R&D Investments under Endogenous Cluster Formation
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29016892
Y2  - 2024-12-04T09:09:35
ER  -