TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-
transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets
that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain
subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of
markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered as the case in
between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results of Qin (1993)
to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game
we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This
market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of
competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and
thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.
DA  - 2011
KW  - Market Games
KW  - Competitive Payoffs
KW  - Inner Core
LA  - eng
PY  - 2011
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 42-
TI  - Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29021635
Y2  - 2024-11-22T12:34:29
ER  -