TY  - GEN
AB  - The seminal work of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) on how preemption erodes the value
of an option to wait raises general questions about the relation between models in discrete
and continuous time and thus about the interpretation of its central result, relying on an
“infinitely fine grid”. Here it is shown that the preemption equilibrium is the limit of the
unique symmetric equilibria of the game when reduced to any sequence of grids becoming
infinitely fine. Furthermore, additional subgame perfect equilibria using conventional
continuous-time mixed strategies are identified.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Preemption
KW  - discrete time
KW  - continuous time
KW  - subgame perfect equilibrium
KW  - convergence
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 16-
TI  - On preemption in discrete and continuous time
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29022233
Y2  - 2024-11-22T09:39:54
ER  -