TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model
characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency.
However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide existence
theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling games.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Signaling Games
KW  - Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
KW  - Equilibrium Refinement
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 45-
TI  - Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29035369
Y2  - 2024-11-22T09:59:15
ER  -