TY  - GEN
AB  - We investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of
coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can
explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between
coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs.
In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant
equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9%
of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another
9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we
compare our results with predictions of commonly used models of higher-order
beliefs.
DA  - 2016
KW  - Higher-order beliefs
KW  - coordination failure
KW  - cognitive abilities
KW  - experimental economics
KW  - game theory
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 41-
TI  - Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-29058652
Y2  - 2024-11-21T18:11:57
ER  -