TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending
a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message.
While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information,
but has to choose an action depending on the message he receives. The action then
yields to some utility for Sender and Receiver. We only make a few assumptions about the
utility functions of both players, so situations may arise where the Sender’s preferences are
such that she sends a message trying to convince the Receiver about a certain state of the
world, which is not the true one. In a finite setting we state conditions for full revelation,
i.e. when the Receiver always learns the truth. Furthermore we describe the player’s behavior
if only partial revelation is possible. For a continuous setting we show that additional
conditions have to hold and that these do not hold for "smooth" preferences and utility, e.g.
in the classic example of quadratic loss utilities.
DA  - 2016
KW  - cheap-talk
KW  - communication
KW  - costly disclosure
KW  - full revelation
KW  - increasing differences
KW  - Sender-Receiver game
KW  - verifiable information
LA  - eng
PY  - 2016
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Communication games with optional verification
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29076927
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:28:47
ER  -