TY  - GEN
AB  - We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy.
In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information
to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according
to the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last
player to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the player’s
behavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play
the same game with his successor.<br />
We state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it
takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures
and state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution
and other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by
the least informed players.
DA  - 2017
KW  - communication network
KW  - dynamic network game
KW  - hierarchical structure
KW  - information transmission
LA  - eng
PY  - 2017
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Information transmission in hierarchies
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29091428
Y2  - 2024-11-22T09:16:42
ER  -