TY  - GEN
AB  - This text reviews a recent approach to modeling "radically uncertain"
behavior in strategic interactions. By rigorously rooting the approach
in decision theory, we provide a foundation for applications of Knightian uncertainty in mechanism design, principal agent and moral hazard models. We discuss critical assessments and provide alternative
interpretations of the new equilibria in terms of equilibrium in beliefs,
and as a boundedly rational equilibrium in the sense of a population
equilibrium. We also discuss the purification of equilibria in the spirit
of Harsanyi.
DA  - 2017
KW  - Knightian Uncertainty in Games
KW  - Strategic Ambiguity
KW  - Ellsberg Games
KW  - Purification
LA  - eng
PY  - 2017
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 22-
TI  - Uncertain acts in games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29091716
Y2  - 2024-11-22T02:12:02
ER  -