TY  - GEN
AB  - We study a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game:
ex-ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium
payoffs from the subsequent bargaining game. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete
characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated
pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other
structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable
at all. The analysis implies that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is small in
(generically) pairwise stable networks.
DA  - 2017
KW  - Bargaining
KW  - Network Formation
KW  - Noncooperative Games
LA  - eng
PY  - 2017
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 42-
TI  - Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29132875
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:53:06
ER  -