TY  - GEN
AB  - We study general properties of pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies, i.e. when
agents' utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not
matter. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we impose general link
externality conditions on utility such as ordinal convexity and ordinal strategic complements.
Depending on these rather weak notions of link externalities, we show that pairwise stable
networks of various structure exist. For stronger versions of the convexity and strategic
complements conditions, we are even able to characterize all pairwise stable networks: they
are nested split graphs (NSG). We illustrate these results with many examples from the
literature, including utility funtions that arise from games with strategic complements played
on the network and utility funtions that depend on centrality measures such as Bonacich
centrality.
DA  - 2018
KW  - Network Formation
KW  - Noncooperative Games
KW  - Convexity
KW  - Strategic Complements
LA  - eng
PY  - 2018
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 32-
TI  - Pairwise stable networks in homogeneous societies
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29168175
Y2  - 2024-11-24T00:25:20
ER  -