TY  - GEN
AB  - Smith (1995) presented a necessary and sufficient condition for the finite-
horizon perfect folk theorem. In the proof of this result, the author constructed a family
of five-phase strategy profiles to approach feasible and individually rational payoff vec-
tors of the stage-game. These strategy profiles are not subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the finitely repeated game. I illustrate this fact with a counter-example. However,
the characterization of attainable payoff vectors by Smith remains true. I provide an
alternative proof.
DA  - 2018
KW  - Finitely Repeated Games
KW  - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
KW  - Folk Theorem
KW  - Discount Factor
LA  - eng
PY  - 2018
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 19-
TI  - A note on ”Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem” [Econometrica, 63 (2): 425-430, 1995.]
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29303808
Y2  - 2024-11-22T10:21:00
ER  -