TY - GEN AB - I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game. DA - 2018 KW - Finitely Repeated Games KW - Pure Strategy KW - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium KW - Limit Perfect Folk Theorem KW - Discount Factor LA - eng PY - 2018 SN - 0931-6558 SP - 32- TI - A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29303825 Y2 - 2024-11-22T10:27:37 ER -