TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper, we present a model of finitely repeated games in which
players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of a finite rep-
etition of a finite stage-game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players
can employ objectively ambiguous actions by using imprecise probabilistic devices such
as Ellsberg urns to conceal their intentions. We find that adding an infinitesimal level
of ambiguity can be enough to approximate collusive payoffs via subgame perfect equi-
librium strategies of the finitely repeated game. Our main theorem states that if each
player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs in ambiguous actions, any feasible pay-
off vector of the original stage-game that dominates the mixed strategy maxmin payoff
vector is (ex-ante and ex-post) approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies of the finitely repeated game with discounting. Our condition is also necessary.
DA  - 2018
KW  - Objective Ambiguity
KW  - Ambiguity Aversion
KW  - Finitely Repeated Games
KW  - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
KW  - Ellsberg Urns
KW  - Ellsberg Strategies
LA  - eng
PY  - 2018
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 28-
TI  - Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29303844
Y2  - 2024-11-25T21:10:46
ER  -