TY  - GEN
AB  - This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous
incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that
ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information.
Under these conditions players form subjective prior belief sets that satisfy a rectangularity
condition which leads to dynamically consistent behavior. Furthermore, we
give an example which shows that ambiguity can introduce new Sequential Equilibria.
DA  - 2018
KW  - sequential equilibrium
KW  - ambiguity
KW  - dynamic consistency
KW  - multiple priors
KW  - imprecise information
LA  - eng
PY  - 2018
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 54-
TI  - Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29304923
Y2  - 2024-11-22T04:19:34
ER  -