TY  - GEN
AB  - This paper studies the implications of a segmented labor market with efficient wage–
employment bargaining on the internal labor market and a competitive external labor
market on the temporary equilibrium of a closed monetary macroeconomy of the AS–
AD type with government activity, fiat money, and expectations. Workers have identical
preferences, those on the internal labor market are represented by a labor union. There
is no mobility between the labor markets.
Union power measured by the share of the production surplus allotted to the union
and union density measured by the fraction of workers who are union members impact
the functional income distribution, but neither affect the individual employment levels
nor the aggregate employment level and the aggregate supply function. The wage on the
internal labor market is above the wage on the external labor market if and only if the
profit share of total revenue is smaller than under a fully competitive labor market.
Unique temporary equilibria exist for all combinations of union power and union density.
The paper provides a complete comparative-statics analysis showing in particular a
negative price effect of union power and a positive price effect of union density. In general,
the effects of union power and union density on any equilibrium value are usually of
opposite signs. Single-labor-market models with a fully competitive or a fully unionized
labor market are special or limiting cases of the segmented-labor-market model.
DA  - 2018
LA  - eng
PY  - 2018
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 42-
TI  - Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining in a Macroeconomic Model
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29305975
Y2  - 2024-11-21T17:39:57
ER  -