TY - GEN AB - BeauchĂȘne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. This note, de fines rectangular beliefs over the full state space in the same setting as BeauchĂȘne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular be- liefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of BeauchĂȘne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well. DA - 2019 KW - Bayesian Persuasion KW - Ambiguity Aversion KW - Dynamic Consistency LA - eng PY - 2019 SN - 0931-6558 TI - A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29344891 Y2 - 2024-11-22T01:53:06 ER -