TY  - GEN
AB  - We study the effect of strategic and partisan voting on electoral outcomes, and on the
relative popularity of the victor. Voters are randomly assigned to be partisan or strategic.
When all voters are strategic in a plurality election, any equilibrium manipulation of the
outcome elects a popular leader. Voting populations with a large proportion of partisan voters
are more at risk of electing an unpopular leader: in elections with three candidates, if only
one-third of the population is partisan, then the winner of the election may be unpopular
with two-thirds of voters. We derive exact bounds for the proportion of the population
that benefits from manipulation of the election outcome by strategic voters, for arbitrary
numbers of voters, candidates, partisans and strategic voters. The analysis also shows that
the unpopularity of the election winner differs between partisan and strategic voters. When
most voters are partisan, they may be the vast majority of those who gain from strategic
voting.
DA  - 2019
KW  - Morality and Politics
KW  - Partisan Voting
KW  - Winner Unpopularity
KW  - Plurality
KW  - Impact Heterogeneity
KW  - Randomization
LA  - eng
PY  - 2019
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 32-
TI  - Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29382043
Y2  - 2024-11-22T07:18:58
ER  -